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Wildermuth v. State: DEFENDANT'S 
CONFRONTATION RIGHT NOT 
VIOlA TED BY ALLOWING 
ALLEGED ABUSED CIDID TO 
TESTIFY VIA CLOSED CIRCUIT 
TELEVISION 
In Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 
A.2d 245 (1987), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article S 9-102, which allows 
the testimony of an alleged abused child to 
be taken via closed-circuit television, does 
not violate the right of the defendant to 
confront his accuser. Moreover, the judge 
must determine that the child's testimony 
in open court "will result in the child suf-
fering serious emotional distress such that 
the child cannot reasonably communi-
cate" as a condition precedent to the 
invocation of S 9-102. 
Appellants Wildermuth and McKoy 
were separately tried and convicted of 
child abuse in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County. At their respective trials, 
the judge allowed the alleged child victims 
to testify via closed-circuit television, pur-
suant to S 9-102, which provides in perti-
nent part that: 
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as 
defined in S 5-901 of the Family Law 
Article or Article 27, S 35A of the 
Code, a court may order that the testi-
mony of a child victim be taken out-
side the courtroom and shown in the 
courtroom by means of closed-circuit 
television if: (i) The testimony is taken 
during the proceeding; and (ii) The 
judge determines that testimony by 
the child victim in the courtroom will 
result in the child suffering serious 
emotional distress such that the child 
cannot reasonably communicate. 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 
(a)(1) (1984). 
While the Appellants' cases were pend-
ing in the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari and consoli-
dated the cases to address the issues raised 
by both Appellants. 
On appeal, the court addressed the issue 
of whether § 9-102 denies the defendant 
the right to confront his accuser under the 
sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Both 
Appellants argued that § 9-102 denies them 
the right of confrontation. In Wilder-
muth's case, the judge directed the use of 
closed-circuit television on the basis that 
two expert witnesses testified that the 
child witness would be traumatized if she 
were to testify in open court. In McKoy's 
case, the judge allowed the use of closed-
circuit television after the child witness 
was called to testify in open court but 
became upset and unable to reasonably 
communicate. 
The court had to determine whether 
actual physical confrontation was within 
the intended scope of the sixth amendment 
and article 21. 
After discussing the history of the right 
of confrontation, the court concluded that 
when the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
and the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution were adopted, it was 
generally accepted that witnesses "or-
dinarily would meet the accused face-to-
face in open court." Wildermuth, 310 Md. 
at 506, 530 A.2d at 280. For example, in 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1895), the United States Supreme Court 
noted that the use of physical confronta-
tion was: 
to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits, such as were sometimes used 
in civil cases, being used against the 
prisoner in lieu of personal examina-
tion and cross-examination of the 
witness in which the accused has an 
opportunity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience 
of the witness, but of compelling him 
to stand face to face with the witness, 
but of compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his 
demeanor upon the stand and the man-
ner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. 
Id. at 504. Similarly, the court in Crawford 
v. State, stated that: "it is the primary 
object of the constitutional provision 
requiring confrontation to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits from being used 
against a person accused of a crime in lieu 
of personal examination and cross-
examination of the witnesses." Crawford 
v. State, 282 Md. 210, 214, 383 A.2d 1097, 
1099 (1978). 
The court went on to consider the pur-
poses underlying the right of confronta-
tion. It noted Wigmore's view that 
confrontation is a means to protect full 
cross-examination as well as to allow the 
judge and jury the opportunity to observe 
the witness' "deportment while testify-
ing," which bears on credibility. Wilder· 
muth, 310 Md. at 507, 530 A.2d at 281. The 
advantages from the witness' physical pres-
ence are more for the benefit of the tribu-
nal than for the benefit of the accused. Id. 
Indeed, many courts have found that con-
frontation does not have to be in the 
nature of an "eyeball-to-eyeball" 
encounter between the defendant and his 
accuser. Id. But the essential purpose of 
confrontation is to facilitate the search for 
truth, which ordinarily requires cross-
examination and the presence of the 
witness before the fact-fmder and the 
defendant.ld. at 509,530 A.2d at 281. The 
court found that these latter confrontation 
requirements were satisfied in the present 
cases since cross-examination did occur 
and the fact-finders as well as the defen-
dants could view the witnesses during their 
testimony. Id. at 510, 530 A.2d at 282. 
However, the question remained 
whether the defendants' confrontation 
rights were denied when the child 
witnesses were allowed to testify without 
having to view the defendants. The court 
examined cases where the denial of a face-
to-face challenge was found to violate sixth 
amendment rights or article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. For 
example, in United States v. Benfte/d, the 
Eighth Circuit held that a procedure under 
which the witness' deposition was taken 
via a television monitor in a separate room 
from the defendant and then later shown 
to the jury, was a violation of the defen-
dant's sixth amendment rights since 
"recollection veracity, and communica-
tion are influenced by face-to-face chal-
lenge." United States v. Benfield, 593 F .2d 
815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). And in Dutton v. 
State, the court held that the right to con-
frontation, pursuant to article 21, was 
violated when the defendant was excluded 
from the room in which the witness testi-
fied. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 
417 (1914). Thus, the court concluded that 
the "right of confrontation ordinarily 
includes . . . the right of the accused to be 
seen by his accuser ... " Wildermuth, 310 
Md. at 512, 530 A.2d at 282. Moreover, if 
the accuser must see the defendant face-to-
face, the search for truth will be enhanced 
since it "tends to impress upon the witness 
the seriousness and solemnity of the occa-
sion, and as a consequence, the neccessity 
for truthful testimony." Id. 
Notwithstanding the benefits derived 
from face-to-face challenges, there are occa-
sions when it is permissible to allow the 
accuser to testify without having to view 
the defendant. Essentially, there are limita-
tions to the constitutional right of con-
frontation. The Supreme Court found 
support for the proposition in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), where the tran-
scribed testimony given by a witness dur-
ing a preliminary hearing was held to have 
been properly introduced at trial, since the 
witness was "unavailable," and there was 
sufficient evidence to show that the testi-
mony was "reliable." Id. 
In the present case, the court had to 
determine whether the "unavailability" 
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and "reliability" prongs of the Roberts test 
were satisfied. Reliability can be estab-
lished by the ordinary aspects of confron-
tation such as "cross-examination, 
testimony under oath, [and the] ability of 
[the] judge, jury, and accused to view the 
witness during [his] testimony." Wilder· 
muth, 310 Md. at 515, 530 A.2d. at 285. 
The court found that these factors were 
satisfied in the present cases. Unavailabili-
ty can be shown by establishing a suffi-
cient necessity for allowing the child 
witness to testisfy without viewing the 
defendant. But, if the accuser should phys-
ically view the accused to enhance reliabili-
ty, then it must be established that there is 
an overriding "necessity" for allowing the 
witness to testify without viewing the 
defendant, which results in the child's 
"unavailability" for a face-to-face 
encounter.Id. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285. The 
court went on to consider the "epidemic" 
of child abuse, and the obstacles to effec-
tive prosecution of an alleged offender 
when the principle witness is a young 
child. The court noted that the victim can 
be further traumatized by giving testimo-
ny, in open court, face-to-face with the 
alleged abuser. Id. Moreover, the legisla-
ture recognized the need to protect the 
child victim from the trauma associated 
with open court testimony by enacting § 
9-102. 
Notwithstanding the desirability of pro-
tecting child victims, there must be evi-
dence that the particular child witness will 
be traumatized by testifying in open court. 
Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286. If there is a 
finding that the patticular child victim will 
be traumatized by open court testimony, 
§ 9-102 may be invoked and the child vic-
tim becomes "unavailable" for open court 
testimony.Id. But it is the judge who must 
determine "that testimony by the child 
victim in the courtroom will result in the 
child suffering serious emotional distress 
such that the child cannot reasonably com-
municate," in accordance with the stan-
dard of § 9-102 (a)(i)(ii). Id. Therefore, 
subsection (a)(iXii) acts as a condition prec-
endent to the general application of 
§ 9-102. Id. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287. 
The court had to determine whether the 
condition precedent of subsection (a)(iXii) 
had been satisfied in both cases. McKoy 
did not raise the issue of the child witness' 
ability to communicate in open court, and 
therefore, the court did not consider the 
effect of subsection (a)(i)(ii) as applied in 
his case. Wildermuth, however, raised the 
issue of whether the condition precedent 
had been established and the court limited 
its examination to the finding in his case. 
In Wildermuth's case, two expert 
witnesses testified in general terms that 
children would fmd it "hard to respond" 
to questions in open court or would be 
"intimidated" which could result in a 
"greater likelihood of inability to 
respond." Id. at 521, 530 A.2d at 287. 
Additionally, the judge neither questioned 
nor observed the child witness before 
granting the use of closed-circuit televi-
sion.Id. 
The court concluded that the requisite 
finding of subsection (a)(iXii) had not been 
established absent a specific showing that 
the patticular child witness would be 
traumatized such that the child could not 
reasonably communicate. Id. Moreover, 
the judge should observe and question the 
child witness in order to more fairly deter-
mine the need to invoke the statute. Id. 
Also, expert witnesses must be specific and 
discuss the detrimental effect of open court 
testifying on the particular child. Id. Since 
evidence of the necessity of allowing the 
child witness to testify via closed-circuit 
television was not established under the 
standards set forth in Roberts, the court 
reversed Wildermuth's conviction and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
-In McKoy's case, the judge had the 
opportunity to determine that the child 
could not reasonably communicate in 
open court. Therefore, the invocation of § 
9-102 was proper, and for the reasons dis-
cussed previously, McKoy's conviction 
was affirmed since his right to confronta-
tion was not violated. 
As a result of the holding in Wildermuth 
v. State, there must be sufficient evidence 
that the patticular child witness will suffer 
trauma to such an extent that it interferes 
with the child's ability to communicate 
before the invocation of § 9-102, and that 
ordinarily the judge must be given the 
opportunity to observe and question the 
child before that finding is made. The 
question remains whether the court's hold-
ing with respect to subsection (a)(i)(ii) is 
such a high standard that it substantially 
bars the invocation of § 9-102 and under-
mines the intent of § 9-102, which taken as 
a whole, is to "minimize" the trauma asso-
ciated with open court testimony. 
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